Multinational companies pay taxes in different jurisdictions which have different tax rates. Hence, they can develop incentives to allocate a high share of profit to low tax jurisdictions and a low share of profit to high tax jurisdictions. National tax authorities may give companies specific rulings relevant to their business models to clarify how their corporate tax will be calculated. While such tax rulings are legal in general, they may violate state aid rules if they use methodologies to establish transfer prices with no economic justification and which unduly shift profit to reduce the taxes they pay. At this event we will address the following questions:
- Under what conditions do tax rulings violate EU state aid rules?
- What is the rationale and justification behind relevant cases and decisions by DG Competition like the Apple case in Ireland?
- Does DG Competition’s approach raise concerns about Member State sovereignty?
- What challenges emerge from the intersection between competition policy rules and international taxation and how can we address them?
- Do competition policy cases involving taxation of multinational companies have an impact on corporate investments in Europe?
- Do they help to prioritize policy initiatives that fight corporate tax evasion?